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The one thing I will say is that, in contrast to Gene's recom-
mendation, and I think-wish-that future decisions be left to fu-
ture policymakers. My later years in Congress teach me one thing,
and that is that future decisions will never be left to future policy-
makers as long as present policymakers can prevent it. I think that
is really beyond hope.
For the immediate outlook, I think we simply have to look for-
ward to more of the same, particularly since the strategy in the
1990 budget agreement was to redefine the budget problem. We
discovered that a $150 billion deficit was not enough to excite leg-
islators into action, and therefore we redefined it as a $300 billion
deficit, which seems to have more impediments in terms of individ-
ual initiative. But it also means that at these very high levels of
the new deficit targets, we are going to be on this treadmill of esti-
mating spending and then scrambling to back-and-fill in ' terms of
taxes for some time. This produces a scattershot approach in terms
of who is vulnerable and what sources of revenue are possible.
WILLIAM D. POPKIN
PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA, BLOOMINGTON,
INDIANA
I will react to some of the problems that Gene highlighted, in
two broad categories. One is the problem of creating fiscal slack,
and the second is the problem of the interaction of the tax and the
budget process. It is obviously no secret-everybody's commented
on it-that we have terrible problems raising taxes, and this has
meant a dramatic flight from federal general revenues. What I.
want to call attention to is what this has meant for the way in
which we raise taxes, even though we don't always call them taxes,
and to suggest that, if this were something people were more aware
of, it might lay the groundwork for a shift in attitudes so that some
of our revenue-raising would be more efficient and perhaps more
fair.
The flight from federal general revenues has been largely in
the form of more or less mandatory costs to fund specific bene-
fits-what you might call a rise in internalized taxes. Now this may
or may not be appropriate, but let me explain some of the things
that I have in mind when I use that description.
First of all, there may be a greater enthusiasm for private reg-
ulation, which can be a form of taxation. I'm thinking here of pro-
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visions in the Clean Air Act, provisions for the disabled, even some
of the provisions of the immigration law, affirmative action in some
ways, problems of leave policy for people with children. This may
not be all bad. Some of these things internalize costs in ways that
are very desirable, but they may simply impose costs on the pri-
vate-sector that, either economically or in terms of equity, are bet-
ter placed upon the general public. If we don't have that option, I
suspect that insofar as we want to achieve certain goals, we will
look more and more towards private regulation-imposing costs on
the private sector. Perhaps some of you would say we won't, and
that's bad also because we won't get expenditures in areas that are
so desperate for expenditures that anything will be an
improvement.
The second form of revenue raising that is not federal general
revenue is user fees, and there's been quite a bit of that in
1990-the gas tax, the increase in Medicare by expanding the base.
I have mixed feelings about all of this. I think the things that they
are spent on are very desirable, and we certainly are undertaxed
compared to other western industrialized nations as far as social
insurance is concerned. But it may be that a lot of the things that
these taxes are spent on, such as public transit, should be financed
through general revenues. We have other kinds of what I call "in-
kind" taxes that are not tied to specific expenditures, but which
are popular in the sense that they are tied to specific purchases by
individuals-sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco are viewed this way.
Many of the taxes-environmental taxes, e.g., a surtax on the cor-
porate income tax base which was meant to fund some of the
Superfund activities-are thought of as in-kind specific user taxes
in some rough sense. Maybe good, maybe not. But it's obvious that
the pressure is in this direction. Now that doesn't mean that noth-
ing happens in the general revenue area. Within the area of federal
general revenues, most people have commented on the problems of
complexity, things like the passive activity loss rule, and the kiddie
tax, and how last minute revenue estimates drive increases in fed-
eral general revenues. I don't propose to comment on those topics.
I do want to comment on one thing nobody has mentioned:
the bubbles. I like the bubbles. I know they're called
Darmanesque--I'm also from outside Washington, but I think
that's considered something of a slur. Bubbles are good. They keep
alive the possibility of progressivity, which I think is healthy. I
think the 31 percent tax rate is directly the result of people react-
ing against the bubble. We still have plenty of bubbles. The corpo-
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rate tax system is still bubbled. We now have these personal ex-
emption and itemized deduction bubbles. They're certainly not
bad if the incentive effects aren't terribly serious. The increase in
the marginal tax rates resulting from these bubbles is really not
dramatic at all. And it's not at all clear to me that they have much
negative incentive effect, which is supposed to be one of the things
you worry about when you have higher marginal tax rates, because
people can't figure out in advance what the impact of these bub-
bles is going to be anyway. This is one compromise made in getting
an increase in federal general revenues that is often thought to be
bad, but may not be so bad after all.
Now I do have some comments as to ways in which we might
increase federal general revenues. No one has mentioned the mini-
mum tax. The minimum tax may be a popular way of raising fed-
eral general revenues, by raising the rate a percentage point here
and there. There also is the fact that it's not indexed for inflation.
Tax Notes recently had a piece on this. I'd like to see a study
about how many years it will take, based on various projections of
inflation and increases in income, before the minimum tax will be-
come the main revenue raiser. That would be a way in which the
federal income tax could become a major source of increases in rev-
enue over time.
The second thing I want to comment on-by way of thinking
big rather than small-is to mention sales taxes. Rostenkowski is
not here, and neither is Al Ullman, for reasons which had some-
thing to do with his sympathy for a sales tax. But I really think we
need to start thinking about general sales tax revenues in this
country. If we're really thinking about getting revenue in any sig-
nificant way, we have to start laying the groundwork for changes to
be made 20 years, 30 years from now, just as the tax expenditure
debate laid the groundwork many years in advance. We don't do
anything along the lines of sales taxes the Way Europe does. Why
not? One reason may be that our federal system leaves it to the
states to raise taxes, and perhaps states feel that their sources of
revenue from sales taxes would be vulnerable if the federal govern-
ment moved in. What about a federal sales tax of about three per-
cent or so, something fairly small to start off with, allowing a credit
against that for any sales tax paid under a state law that provides
for a general sales tax, up to some ceiling-perhaps two-thirds of a
three percent sales tax, leaving a one percent federal sales tax to be
collected. In those states without a general sales tax, a moderate
federal general sales tax would be imposed. This might have some
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attraction for states because the umbrella provided by this kind of
a tax would give some incentive to the states to adopt taxes which
might not otherwise exist. The unemployment insurance model is
the one I'm thinking of, except that here I hope the federal tax
would piggyback onto existing state general sales taxes, rather
than-as I believe was the case initially for most states with re-
spect to the unemployment insurance tax-forcing states to get
into the business of something that they weren't doing at all.
Obviously the problem that people have alluded to is incen-
tives. We just don't have an incentive to raise revenues. People
have wondered why. I think the answer may be fairly straightfor-
ward at this point-we simply mistrust public expenditures. We're
going through a period of time when we just don't think public
revenues and public expenditures are a way of solving problems. I
don't know whether this is a reaction to the war on poverty, or
what it is. We are undertaxed compared to most other industrial-
ized nations, yet there's something about our public sector psyche
that is simply different from a lot of other countries. So we need,
in terms of leadership, as other people have mentioned, some way
of selling to the public some kind of an increase in federal general
revenues. I think it can be done with leadership, with public politi-
cal rhetoric. Surtaxes can be imposed for particular purposes. I can
imagine selling a sales tax, for a while at least, as an education tax.
I know public finance people don't like earmarking, but it can still
be sold. In Massachusetts where I once lived there is the old age
tax; it was nothing but a five percent sales tax, but everybody
called it the old age tax, even though it wasn't earmarked, and
there was in the public rhetoric a sense that this tax was being
imposed for a particular purpose. If we are indeed enthusiastic
about a change for expenditures in a particular area of the law, it
seems to me that the right kind of leadership could sell an increase
in federal revenue in the future for something like education.
I want to make one or two comments about the integration of
the tax/budget process that's been alluded to. We now have the
pay-as-you-go system which links taxes to entitlement expendi-
tures. By "entitlement" I mean something viewed as a political en-
titlement in the sense that it's too hard to repeal. "Entitlement" in
the sense I am using means social security and welfare law-things
for which the social contract is supposed to be so powerful that it
is just not proper to withdraw these particular expenditures, usu-
ally redistribution of income activities.
In the pay-as-you-go system, there is a linkage of taxes and
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certain kinds of spending. The problem that I see with this is that
it's too limited. Tax expenditures are very often, in the way I'm
using the word "entitlement," not entitlements at all. They are
analogous to discretionary spending. And this is true of many of
the social capital types of expenditures that have been extremely
popular, e.g.,in the 1990 Congress, child care and housing. I can't
see why people who worry about tradeoffs should not be able, if
they end a tax expenditure, to increase discretionary spending. I
don't know politically why this was not considered. Maybe it was,
and rejected. It may have something to do with the hostility to the
phrase tax expenditures. In this respect I think we might be paying
the price for the hostility to tax expenditures by not. including
them in the tradeoff with certain kinds of discretionary spending.
The only suggestion I would make along these lines is that we con-
sider reviving political integration of tax provisions with spending
provisions. By political integration I mean integration of the com-
mittee consideration of certain kinds of activities, for example,
with co-consideration by the education authorization committees
and the tax committees, linking together reductions in tax expend-
itures with increases in discretionary spending on various kinds of
education. I believe this would take a change in law, but it seems
to me that it would be a reasonable experiment if we are serious
about education. We might even consider taxing what some con-
sider the original issue discount on some of the prepaid tuition
plans; I wish somebody had thought of doing this when we got rid
of the exemption for the living expense portion of scholarships, be-
cause there were a lot of elements of federal revenue that could
have been squeezed out of the tax expenditure system and placed
in discretionary expenditures in the area of education.
C. EUGENE STEUERLE
Let me make one comment on each commentator. I tend to
agree with Gail's question whether future decisions would be left
to future decisionmakers as long as present decisionmakers can
prevent it. I do think that there are subtle ways over a long period
of time where we can have an enormous impact in ways that--if we
can just get them into the system-are often acceptable to
policymakers.
I'll give two quick examples. One is in the Social Security Act
of 1983, when we increased the retirement age from 65 to 67. That
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